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IDENTIFYING TRAINING GAPS IN RQ-7B SHADOW: A U.S. ARMY UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM 
John E. Stewart 
U.S. Army Research Institute, Ft. Rucker, AL, USA 
Martin L. Bink  
U.S. Army Research Institute, Ft. Benning, GA, USA 
The mission of the RQ-7B has changed radically since 2003, when unmanned 
aircraft system (UAS) ownership shifted from Military Intelligence (MI) to  Army 
Aviation.  Instead of passive observation, RQ-7B  operators must now acquire active 
scout-reconnaissance skills.  Initial training takes place at Ft. Huachuca, AZ,  the 
Army’s main MI installation.  Operators then report to their unit, usually a Brigade 
Combat Team (BCT). This research focused on (a) type training received at the 
schoolhouse (MI/scout-reconnaissance), (b)  training received at the BCT,  and (c) 
opportunities for training. It was  found that schoolhouse training still was primarily 
MI, (e.g., image analysis and vehicle identification). Interviews with BCT staff 
officers identified 10 critical  scout-reconnaissance skills not trained in the 
schoolhouse. These required additional training, mostly on the job in the unit, 
because opportunities for scout-reconnaissance training at home station were 
limited.  The research concluded that more scout-reconnaissance training should 
take place at the schoolhouse. 
The RQ-7B configuration of the Shadow is a 380 lb aircraft, with a 14 ft wingspan.  It is 
powered by a 38 hp Wankel rotary engine, can operate at altitudes up to 14,000 ft., has a range of 
over 200 mi, and an endurance exceeding 5 hr.  As part of the shift of its mission to aviation, 
RQ-7Bs are being retrofitted with laser target designators to supplement the electro-optical and 
thermal vision devices that comprise the mission payload (U.S Army Roadmap for UAS, 2010-
2035, p. 76).  Shadow currently is a Brigade level asset and located within the Special Troops 
Support Battalion,  Military Intelligence (MI) Company of both light and heavy Brigade Combat 
Teams (BCT). 
 The original mission of the RQ-7B Shadow UAS was intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance, (ISR), in which the air vehicle operator (AO) and mission payload operator (PO) 
proceed to predetermined coordinates, observe and  report  on activities within this area, and await 
instructions to proceed to another location or return to base.  Since 2003, the mission has changed 
considerably to one of scout-reconnaissance more similar to missions flown by manned Army scout 
helicopters, such as the OH-58D. The scout-reconnaissance mission differs from ISR in that the AO 
and PO play a more active role in its execution, for example, they may be directed to actively search 
on either side of a roadway to determine if a convoy’s route is free of potential threats.  If threats are 
detected, they are reported to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), which relays the information to 
a ground commander or the crew of an OH-58D armed helicopter.  For manned-unmanned 
operations, the RQ-7B operators could report the target coordinates directly to the crew of the OH-
58D.  In short, the RQ-7B is no longer a data collection platform, but a pilotless scout aircraft.  
 
 
The current research effort was initiated at the request of the Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) Capabilities Manager-UAS (TCM-UAS).  That is, it was unclear at the 
outset to what degree RQ-7B aircrews were trained to execute scout and reconnaissance 
missions.  With the emerging scout-reconnaissance role of RQ-7B, TCM-UAS was convinced 
that UAS operators must now be trained to think and act like scouts, whose role is active 
observation, interpretation, and reporting of potentially hostile activities in contrast to collecting 
ISR data for later imagery analysis. Given the apparent gap between the skills required to 
execute scout-reconnaissance missions and RQ-7B training, the current research effort was 
conducted to determine what aspects of the scout-reconnaissance mission could be performed by 
RQ-7B aircrews, and to  identify how and where RQ-7B operators could be trained on the 
identified scout-reconnaissance skills.  Little is known about the efficacy of  scout-
reconnaissance training for UAS aircrews. The bulk of the research literature has addressed 
training in the context of aircrew errors and their contribution to UAS mishaps (e.g., Thompson, 
Tvaryanas, & Constable, 2005), rather than tactical skills training.  
  A preliminary assessment of RQ-7B aircrew collective training, at the Joint Readiness 
Training Center (JRTC) at Ft. Polk, LA  (i.e., Stewart Barker, & Bink, 2010) provided an inkling 
that collective training needs existed for the RQ-7B. The aggregate perspective of senior training 
personnel was that  there were few opportunities for RQ-7B teams to train for scout-
reconnaissance missions, with most missions at JRTC tending to be ISR. That research also 
underscored the need for a closer and more detailed look at both schoolhouse training and the 
actual employment of the RQ-7B in the BCT, while in theatre, and at home station.   
Method 
Identification of Scout-reconnaissance Skills for Cavalry Scout and OH-58D Pilot  
 
The first step was to identify possible scout-reconnaissance skills for RQ-7B operators.  
To do so, programs of instruction (POI) for two Army career specialties (i.e., Cavalry ground 
scout and  OH-58D Common Core and aircraft qualification Track Course) primarily engaged in 
the scout-reconnaissance role were analyzed.  The skill sets in these three POIs were vetted by 
three subject-matter experts (SME), retired Army aviators familiar with scout and reconnaissance 
operations, for relevance to tactical employment of the RQ-7B .  
 
Determining Relevance of Scout-reconnaissance Skills for RQ-7B Operators 
 
The second step was to define the training-critical scout-reconnaissance skills for RQ-7B 
operators from the skills identified in the first step. A list of 25 critical scout-reconnaissance 
skills derived from analyses of the POIs were determined by SMEs to be relevant to RQ-7B 
missions. These were incorporated into an interview protocol in which they were to be rated for 
criticality by respondents, from command positions within a BCT, and in leadership positions 
within an RQ-7B platoon. 
 
Determining the Most Critical Scout-Reconnaissance Skills for RQ-7B Mission 
 
Assessment of these two dimensions of criticality (i.e., skill importance and operator 
preparedness) came from structured interviews with nine operational unit primary staff officers 
 
 
(Lieutenant Colonel though Captain)  at three BCTs located at their home stations, and six 
principal members of two RQ-7B platoons from two of these BCTs  (Warrant Officer 2 
/Sergeant First Class/Specialist 4).  BCT officers’ and platoon members’ input was used to 
identify and rank order the most critical scout-reconnaissance skills for RQ-7B aircrews.  In each 
structured  interview, two researchers presented each set of 25 skills to respondents and recorded 
their verbal responses.  In general, there were few disagreements in the records of each 
researcher.  In those instances of disagreement, the first author resolved the discrepancy after 
reviewing the audio record.  In particular, responses to the interview question for, “What 
additional training do (aircrews) receive at the unit to support this skill?” were used to indicate 
training gaps, and responses to the interview question for, “What additional training is required 
(beyond current) to prepare (aircrews) for this skill?” were used to indicate how the critical 
scout-reconnaissance skills might be trained.  “Training critical” skills were defined as those 
skills deemed by respondents to be of high importance and for which UAS aircrews were 
perceived as being poorly prepared to perform (requiring additional training) when reporting to 
the  unit (BCT). 
 
Determining How Scout-Reconnaissance Skills are Trained in the Schoolhouse 
 
The final step was to determine (a) if the identified critical scout-reconnaissance skills, 
ascertained from the scout POIs and structured interviews, were trained in the schoolhouse  (b) if 
they were, then  how these critical skills were trained, and (c) if not, what scout-reconnaissance  
skills actually were trained.  To accomplish this, a qualitative analysis of schoolhouse training 
POIs  (UAS Common Core and [RQ-7] Shadow Operator) was conducted.  The training program 
was also examined to determine the training environment ( i.e., classroom, simulator or aircraft,  
or field exercises).  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Relevance of Cavalry Scout and OH-58D Pilot Skills to RQ-7B  
 
The Ground Cavalry Scout and IERW OH-58D(R) Track Courses include not only target 
detection and recognition, but also practical hands-on training and application in reconnaissance 
techniques for area and route reconnaissance missions. These missions resemble those that RQ-
7B aircrews would execute. Skills trained for these missions were further analyzed for 
application to RQ-7B.  Importantly, one of the 25 mission-relevant skills was not included in any 
of the reviewed POIs but was mentioned as important by TCM-UAS and SMEs, as well as most 
of those BCT officers interviewed.  This non-POI skill was Tactical Operations Center (TOC) 
operations.  
 
Ten Most Training-Critical Scout-Reconnaissance Skills for RQ-7B 
Of the total 25 scout-reconnaissance skills previously identified, 10 were distinguished as 
most critical in terms of being ranked high in importance and low in preparedness across all 






   
Respondents were also asked what additional scout-reconnaissance training supporting 
these critical skills RQ-7B operators received when reporting to the unit.  A glance at Table 2 
shows that the bulk of the responses concerned training at the Combat Training Center (e.g., 
JRTC), formal training drills in the unit, and on the job training at the unit level, most while 
deployed in theatre. Two mentioned schoolhouse, even though the question was about unit 
training. When asked what additional training is required beyond that currently available, the 
modal responses, as evidenced in Table 3, are formal unit training and training in the 
schoolhouse.  It appears that respondents believed that the schoolhouse should incorporate a 
greater share of the burden for scout-reconnaissance training. In brief, it seems that Table 2 
reflects the current status of RQ-7B training, whereas Table 3 implies the preferred status of this 
training.  
Table 2  
Response Frequencies for Additional Types of Training Currently Received on Ten Critical Skills 
Type of Training 
On the Job Formal Unit Combat Training 
Center 
Schoolhouse 
19 22 27 2 
 
Table 3 
Response Frequencies for Additional Types of Training Required Beyond Current Training on 
Ten Critical Skills 
Type of Training 
On the Job Formal Unit Combat Training 
Center 
Schoolhouse 
4 10 2 10 
 
Scout-Reconnaissance Skills Rated as Most Critical by Respondents 
 
Skill Areas 
  Tactical Operations Center (TOC) operations.  
 SPOT and SALUTE reports (size, activity, location, uniform, time and equipment). 
 Actions on contact. 
 Target handover (visual/non laser). 
 Fundamentals of security. 
   Fundamentals of reconnaissance 
 Aerial observation 
 Downed aircraft recovery operations 
 UAS integration into the BCT 
 Laser target handoff to the ground. 
 
 
How Critical Scout-Reconnaissance Skills are Trained in the Schoolhouse 
The UAS Common Core POI included  instruction in a classroom environment on the 
principles of Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) which comprised 
lessons in map reading, operational terms and graphics, UAS employment in military operations, 
introduction to tactical imagery intelligence, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and 
associated exams.  These tasks cannot be defined as scout-reconnaissance, in the context of 
Army Aviation RSTA operations, in which aircrews must play an active role in developing the 
situation once a target has been identified.   
Common Core also included instruction, in a classroom environment on skills and 
knowledge needed to interpret UAS electro-optical and infrared video to provide detailed and 
rapid feedback on the status of enemy targets, significant activities, and areas of interest.  The 
module also contains lessons on imagery identification techniques, positive battle damage 
assessment, and positive identification of a variety of Soviet era military equipment.  
The Shadow UAS Operator Course is focused on RQ-7B-specific training, which 
includes overviews of unmanned aircraft operator/payload operator systems, simulator and air 
vehicle flight, and a field capstone exercise.  Scout-reconnaissance training is not documented in 
the POI for this course. According to the Common Core and Shadow Operator POIs, none of the 
five primary scout-reconnaissance skills (i.e., TOC operations, SPOT and SALUTE reports, 
Actions on Contact, Target Handover, and Fundamentals of Security) were consistently trained 
in any systematic way in the schoolhouse, and it was difficult to discern exactly which of these 
skills were taught in the simulator.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Training at the UAS Training Battalion (UASTB) at Fort Huachuca, AZ still maintains a 
heavy MI orientation even though it has been eight years since Proponency for UAS passed from 
MI to the Army Aviation Branch.  As a consequence, some skills required by the scout-
reconnaissance deployment of the RQ-7B were not included in the schoolhouse training of RQ-
7B aircrews.  Of the 25 scout-reconnaissance skills identified as relevant to RQ-7B aircrews, ten 
were determined to be critical to the training of aircrews.  In the absence of schoolhouse training, 
it was the task of the unit to train aircrews on the identified scout-reconnaissance skills. The 
absence of schoolhouse training on critical scout-reconnaissance skills imposed the onus on the 
RQ-7B platoon because opportunities for unit-level training often did not present themselves 
prior to deployment to theatre or to live exercises, such as JRTC.   
  One statement by interview respondents (i.e., BCT staff officers) and supported by POI 
analyses summarized one issue with schoolhouse training as it now exists.  The RQ-7B aircrews 
are trained as image analysts, not as scout-reconnaissance  aircrews.  This perception was 
evidenced by the extensive classroom training on map reading, tactical military intelligence, 
identification of Soviet era combat vehicles, and the analysis of electro-optical imagery.  The lag 
in organizational cultures in which an MI climate still persists in the schoolhouse phase of RQ-
7B training was documented by this research effort.  A qualitative analysis of the schoolhouse 
program showed that little of the current training is optimized for the current scout-
reconnaissance role of the Shadow UAS operators.  There was widespread consensus among 
 
 
BCT and RQ-7B platoon respondents that a portion of the scout-reconnaissance training burden 
that currently rests with the unit can be trained successfully in the schoolhouse.  
Beyond the current research, additional issues need to be addressed,  one of which is the 
increasing importance of manned-unmanned missions. In manned-unmanned missions, both 
manned and unmanned aircrews will have to coordinate and communicate for the scout-
reconnaissance training topics covered in this report.  This type of  teaming will involve the 
acquisition of new skill sets by both UAS and manned aircraft communities. Aircrews will not 
only have to become proficient at scout-reconnaissance tasks, but each type of aircrew must 
understand their respective roles, capabilities, and limitations. 
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